MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General Robert A. Breitweiser, USAF

Director for Intelligence

The Joint Staff

SUBJECT : Joint Staff Over-all Intelligence Estimate for

Planning, Part I, Volume I

REFERENCES : J2DM-148-60, 19 April 1960

1. Your memorandum of 19 April contains sentiments which have my wholehearted agreement. Certainly military planners must concern themselves with the "worst case" in terms of enemy capabilities; and they require, as you say, as clear-cut a description of the nature and immediacy of the military threat as our knowledge can provide.

2. But it is also true that military planning, particularly at the national level cannot proceed on the assumption that our funds and resources are so unlimited as to permit the maintenance of maximum readiness and the development of maximum capabilities to meet all enemy threats which could conceivably be derived from their capabilities -- in being and potential. Thus it becomes necessary at some stage in the planning process to introduce estimates concerning the probable trend in the enemies capabilities and in his probable courses of action with respect to employment of these capabilities. This is particularly true at the national level where military planning must in the end, at least, involve national decision with respect to the allocation and division of resources and effort.

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3. If, at this level, there were to exist differing estimates with respect to the nature, immediacy, and magnitude of the enemy threat, the process of national decision making on vital questions would be greatly complicated and we should all be properly subject to the most severe criticism.

4. It seems to me that in intelligence documents prepared primarily for the use of military planners there are two ways to avoid such an unfortunate situation. The first would be to stick very closely to the wording of agreed National Estimates in any prefatory discussion of enemy policy and general courses of action. The alternative would be to start with some assumptions, indicated as being valid for particular planning purposes only, on the possible timing of an outbreak of hostilities and then proceed to give the best intelligence estimate available as to the nature and magnitude of enemy capabilities at that time.

Allen W. Dulles
Director

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